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PROPERTY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The New Mexico appellate courts discussed a broad array of property
related matters during the survey period.' Some questions were issues of
first impression, such as defining the adverse possession requirement of
exclusivity2 and deciding whether counties can enter into leases without
voter approval. 3
Several decisions expanded doctrines existing in New Mexico. These
cases enlarged the rule of constructive notice by possession, 4 recognized
an additional exception to the statute of frauds,5 and applied a shortened
6
redemption period to additional parties in a foreclosure action.
Some decisions during this survey period limited doctrines existing in
New Mexico. These cases imposed a high standard of diligence on searchers
of real property records,' interpreted the definition of water to exclude
silt,' limited a landlord's right of reentry in certain instances, 9 and restricted the doctrine of acquiescence to privately owned land. 0
Other cases deserve mention in the survey article because they clarify
existing law. For example, New Mexico courts discussed the extent of
evidence needed to prove a private nuisance" and the point at which
water rights are severed after the filing of an application to spread water
rights.' 2 The deed construction cases clarified and, in some instances,
complicated existing law by creating exceptions to standard rules of
construction.'
II.

ADVERSE POSSESSION AND RELATED DOCTRINES

A.

Adverse Possession
In New Mexico an adverse possessor attempting to obtain title must
prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the following elements: (1)
a good faith claim of right under color of title; (2) possession that is
actual, visible, exclusive, hostile, and continuous for ten years; and (3)

1.
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13.

This survey covers cases decided during the period beginning March 1, 1988, and ending
1, 1989.
See infra notes 14-35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 340-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 210-31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 304-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 318-39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 390-413 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 414-33 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 232-303 and accompanying text.
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payment of taxes.14 One case during the survey period presented the court
of appeals with questions of hostility and exclusivity. 5
Hernandez v. Cabrera16 involved a dispute between family members
concerning the proper ownership of a parcel of property. In June 1950
Antonia Hernandez deeded a parcel of property to her son, Catarino
Hernandez, the plaintiff. 7 Six months later she deeded an adjoining lot
to her daughter, Rosalia Amada Cabrera. 8 In 1976 Rosalia deeded her
property to her son and his wife, the Cabreras, but she reserved a life
estate for herself.' 9 Rosalia continued to live on her tract until she died
in 1983.20 After Rosalia died, the Cabreras took possession
of Rosalia's
2
property, made improvements, and rented the house. '
After Rosalia's death, her brother Catarino Hernandez also claimed
title to Rosalia's property. Catarino based his claim on a quitclaim deed
he received in July 1950 from Georgia Jones. 22 He conceded that since
1983 the Cabreras had adversely possessed the tract Rosalia had lived
on. 23 Yet, he argued that the Cabreras had not met the ten year requirement because Rosalia's possession was not hostile or exclusive, and
therefore, the Cabreras should not be able to tack their short time of
possession on to Rosalia's many years of possession.24

14. Hernandez v. Cabrera, 107 N.M. 435, 436, 759 P.2d 1017, 1018 (Ct. App. 1988). The court
cites N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-22 (1978) despite the statute's definition of adverse possession as
"an actual and visible appropriation of land, commenced and continued under a color of title and
claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another." The statute does not specifically
refer to exclusivity. It appears that "inconsistent with" and "exclusive" are synonymous although
the New Mexico courts have not equated them.
15. New Mexico courts also decided two other noteworthy adverse possession cases. In Williams
v. Howell, 108 N.M. 225, 770 P.2d 870 (1989), the supreme court held that the color of title
requirement could be met even though the document evidencing title had an inaccurate property
description. Extrinsic evidence not referred to in the deed could be admitted. Id. at 227, 770 P.2d
at 872. The color of title requirement is met as long as the deed and the extrinsic evidence sufficiently
identify the property. Id. Williams is the first case to apply the rule the court adopted in Brylinski
v. Cooper, 95 N.M. 580, 583-84, 624 P.2d 522, 525-26 (1981). In Brylinski, the court allowed
extrinsic evidence not referred to in the inaccurate deed, as opposed to allowing only extrinsic
evidence referred to in the deed.
In Castellano v. Ortega, 108 N.M. 218, 219-20, 770 P.2d 540, 541-42 (Ct. App. 1989), the court
of appeals, in holding that the trial court did not err in finding that a plaintiff had not acquired
title by adverse possession, stated that the trial court could have found that the following evidence
was not clear and convincing: (1) that plaintiff's improvements might not have been on the disputed
land; (2) that any cattle plaintiff ran on the land were not present for ten years; (3) that plaintiff
testified he had paid rent to the true owners; (4) that plaintiff split the profits from selling timber
from the land with the true owners; and (5) that there was a question concerning how often the
plaintiff and his family used the land.
16. 107 N.M. 435, 759 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1988).
17. Id. at 436, 759 P.2d at 1018.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. When Catarino received his parcel from Antonia in 1950, Catarino believed Antonia's
husband (his father) had failed to pay the property taxes on both parcels, that Mrs. Jones had a
valid tax deed, and that he could obtain good title to both parcels from Mrs. Jones. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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The trial court quieted title to the tract in favor of the Cabreras.25
The court found that Catarino's quitclaim deed from Mrs. Jones was
void, that the Cabreras had title to the property by virtue of the deed
from Antonia, and, in the alternative, that the Cabreras had acquired
title by adverse possession. 26 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
27
court's holding that the Cabreras had acquired title by adverse possession.
First, the court of appeals addressed whether Rosalia was a hostile
possessor or a permissive user. Catarino asserted that the court should
have applied a presumption of permissiveness to Rosalia's possession or
that the showing of hostility was insufficient because of the brother and
sister relationship. The court of appeals rejected Catarino's assertions
because: (1) Rosalia and Catarino were not co-tenants who were entitled
to consider the other's possession to be permissive; and (2) Rosalia and
Catarino's relationship was not one that would support an inference of
permissive possession. 2 Perhaps not completely convinced about whether
the sibling relationship supports a presumption of permissiveness, the
court considered the following evidence to be sufficient evidence of
hostility to rebut any presumption of permissiveness: Rosalia mortgaged
the property eleven times; she lived
in the house until her death; and
29
she paid taxes on the property.
Second, the court of appeals addressed whether Rosalia's possession
was exclusive. The issue was whether use of the property by someone
other than the adverse possessor precluded a finding of exclusivity. 3°
Catarino contended that Rosalia's possession was not exclusive because
he crossed her tract of land to reach his lot, and he maintained and
improved the property. 3 The court of appeals followed established adverse
possession theory by concluding that absolute exclusive use is not necessary; the adverse possessor is required to use the property only as an
owner would . 2 An adverse possessor must exercise "dominion and control
for herself and not for another." 3 3 Rosalia resided on the property under
a deed, she paid taxes on the property, and otherwise possessed the
property as a true owner would.3 4 In this situation, allowing a brother
and his wife to use a road to access their property and accepting a
brother's contributions toward maintenance and improvements were not
facts which would defeat the fulfillment of the exclusivity requirement.3 5

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court of appeals did not address the claims of the parties based on their respective
titles. Id.
28. Id. at 437, 759 P.2d at 1019.
29. Id. In fact, the court stated that Rosalia could hardly have done more to establish adverse
possession. Id.
30. Id. The exclusivity issue was an issue of first impression in New Mexico. Id.
31. Id. at 436, 759 P.2d at 1018.
32. Id. at 437-38, 759 P.2d at 1019-20.
33. Id. at 438, 759 P.2d at 1020.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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B.

Doctrine of Acquiescence
The doctrine of acquiescence is a generally accepted principle for settling
boundary disputes.3 6 The doctrine is based on an express or implied
agreement between adjoining landowners that, after a certain period of
time has elapsed, they recognize a certain line as the true boundary
between their properties.37 During the survey period, the court of appeals
adopted the rule that title to state land cannot be obtained under the
doctrine of acquiescence.
In Stone v. Rhodes,3 8 the City of Portales sold Stone twenty acres of
land.3 9 The property was fenced when Stone purchased it.4° The fencing
along its northern border, however, did not continue due east; instead,
4
about halfway across the northern border, it began heading southeast. '
A survey revealed that the northern border of Stone's property did not
head southeast as the fence did.4 2 Stone attempted to fence his property
to include the triangular strip in the northeast corner.4 3 The Rhodeses,
who owned the property to the north of Stone's, interfered with Stone's
construction of the new fence.M Stone filed a petition for a declaratory
judgment determining the correct boundary.45
The trial court concluded the evidence was clear and convincing that
Stone's property included the fenced portion as well as the unfenced
northeast corner.4 The court also found that the jagged fence had been
present for more than thirty years 47 and that the City of Portales, the
Rhodeses, and the Rhodeses' predecessors-in-interest acquiesced in and
recognized the jagged fence as the true boundary line.48 The trial court
based its decision on the doctrine of acquiescence 49 and dismissed Stone's
petition 0 Stone appealed. 5
The court of appeals faced an issue of first impression in New Mexico:
whether a party can obtain an ownership interest by acquiescence to
property owned by a governmental entity. 2 The court of appeals held
that the doctrine of acquiescence applies to privately owned land only

36. Stone v. Rhodes, 107 N.M. 96, 98, 752 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Ct. App. 1988).
37. Id.
38. 107 N.M. 96, 752 P.2d 1112 (Ct. App. 1988).
39. Id. at 97, 752 P.2d at 1113.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 98, 752 P.2d at 1114.
47. Id. at 97, 752 P.2d at 1113.
48. Id. at 98, 752 P.2d at 1114.
49. Id. at 99, 752 P.2d at 1115.
50. Id. at 98, 752 P.2d at 1114. The court of appeals pointed out that the trial court's judgment
was inconsistent with its findings and conclusions. The trial court concluded that the triangular
section in the northeast comer was Stone's property. Yet the trial court recognized the jagged fence
as the true boundary, giving ownership of the triangular portion to the Rhodeses. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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and not to government owned land.53 The court rested its holding on
two bases. First, the theory behind the doctrine of acquiescence is similar
to the theory behind the doctrine of adverse possession.5 4 Under adverse
possession theory, in the absence of a statute subjecting a governmental
entity to the statute of limitations, a person cannot obtain title to state
land by adverse possession despite the length of possession." Second,
the court pointed out that, in New Mexico, a party cannot obtain an
easement by prescription on government land.5 6 The court reasoned that
since a party could not obtain mere use rights against state lands, a
party should not be able to obtain legal title against such lands."
Thus, the Rhodeses did not obtain ownership or use rights to the
unfenced area during the time the City of Portales owned Stone's property."
The Rhodeses' claim of boundary by acquiescence began when Stone
became the landowner. 9
C. Common Boundary Line Rule
Sometimes adjoining landowners are not disputing the location of the
boundary between their properties, but some sort of vegetation marks
the boundary, and the parties disagree as to their rights and obligations
with respect to this growth. In Garcia v. Sanchez,6° prior to Sanchez's
acquisition of her property, a previous owner planted ten elm trees next
to, but inside, the property boundary line .6 The elms grew so that
eventually nine of them sat directly on the boundary. 62 Their trunks
encroached on Garcia's property from one to fourteen inches.6 3 Garcia
filed a complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief against Sanchez.64

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Burgett v. Calentine, 56 N.M. 194, 197, 242 P.2d 276, 277 (1951).
56. Stone, 107 N.M. at 99, 752 P.2d at 1115 (citing Burgett, 56 N.M. at 197, 242 P.2d at 277).
The court reiterated this established rule in Herbertson v. Iliff, 108 N.M. 552, 775 P.2d 754 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 485, 775 P.2d 251 (1989), a case decided during the survey period.
In Herbertson, the court of appeals held that if Herbertson had any prescriptive rights, those rights
did not begin until the United States conveyed the land in 1985 to Iliff, a private individual. Id.
at 554, 775 P.2d at 756. The court of appeals in Herbertson cited Burgett for the principle that
prescriptive rights cannot be acquired against the United States. Id. (citing Burgett, 56 N.M. at
197, 242 P.2d at 277). Herbertson, however, contended that Trigg v. Allemand, 95 N.M. 128, 619
P.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1980), severely limited Burgett. The court of appeals distinguished Trigg from
Burgett and concluded that Herbertson's contention was wrong. Trigg addressed adverse claims
against the State of New Mexico. On the other hand, the federal government owned the land at
issue in Herbertson. Thus, the court did not reach the question of whether Trigg limited Burgett
as to acquisition of prescriptive rights against state-owned land. Herbertson, 108 N.M. at 554, 775
P.2d at 756. For an analysis of Trigg, see Baehr, Property, 12 N.M.L. REv. 459, 468-69 (1982).
See infra notes 96-Ill and accompanying text for a further discussion of Herbertson.
57. Stone, 107 N.M. at 99, 752 P.2d at 1115. The court held that this rule also applied to
municipalities. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 108 N.M. 388, 772 P.2d 1311 (Ct. App. 1989).
61. Id. at 390, 772 P.2d at 1313.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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The trial court ordered Sanchez to pay damages, to trench the roots and
trim the branches yearly, and to provide water and65 nutrients to the trees
to restrict their growth toward Garcia's property. Sanchez appealed.6
Sanchez argued that the common boundary line rule applied to these
facts. 67 The common boundary line rule provides that vegetation growing
on the boundary line of land owned by different persons is generally
considered to be jointly or commonly owned by them.6 If the rule
applies, the adjoining landowners cannot claim damages or request other
equitable relief from encroachment. 69 The court approved the trial court's
application of Colorado's test for determining whether trees growing on
a common boundary line are jointly owned. 70 Colorado's test examines
whether the trees were planted jointly, were jointly cared for, or were
treated as a partition between adjoining properties. 7' Because the trial
court found no oral or written agreement to have the trees form a
that
boundary line, 72 the court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling
73
these trees were not subject to the common boundary line rule.
III.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

The legal relationship between a landlord and a tenant is generally
governed by the provisions of their lease agreement. 7 4 In Easterling v.
Peterson,75 Easterling assumed a lease from the prior lessee of property
owned and leased by Peterson. 76 The lease required Easterling to make
payments on the first of every month, and it also provided for reentry7
77
upon default for untimely payments. Easterling consistently paid late. 1
Over a period of fifteen months, Peterson sent default notices with added
late charges. 79 Easterling consistently paid the sum demanded plus the
accrued late charges.s0 In April 1985, Easterling was approximately three

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 391, 772 P.2d at 1314.
68. Id.; see also Holmberg v. Bergin, 285 Minn. 250, 253, 172 N.W.2d 739, 742 (1969).
69. Garcia, 108 N.M. at 391, 772 P.2d at 1314.
70. Id. at 392, 772 P.2d at 1315.
71. Id. at 391-92, 772 P.2d at 1314-15 (quoting Rhodig v. Keck, 161 Colo. 337, 340, 421 P.2d
729, 731 (1966) (en banc)). The jurisdictions are divided regarding whether a tree originally planted
on the property of one landowner that later grows into the common boundary of the adjoining
owner becomes the common property of both owners. Holmberg, 285 Minn. at 253, 172 N.W.2d
at 742. The New Mexico Court of Appeals did not adopt the view which holds that trees standing
on the boundary line of adjoining landowners are automatically their common property. See id.
72. Garcia, 108 N.M. at 392, 772 P.2d at 1315.
73. Id. at 396, 772 P.2d at 1319; see infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text for the court's
analysis of the trial court's award of damages to Garcia.
74. See Gallup Gamerco Coal Co. v. Irwin, 85 N.M. 673, 515 P.2d 1277 (1973).
75. 107 N.M. 123, 753 P.2d 902 (1988).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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months late in her payments. 8 Peterson exercised 82his right to reenter the
property and subsequently locked out Easterling.
Easterling sued Peterson for breach of contract and damages resulting
from Peterson's reentry and lockout. 83 Easterling alleged that she relied
on Peterson's past acceptance of her late payments to establish a waiver
of the lease requirement for timely payments.8 Peterson filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that under the lease agreement no material
facts existed as to Easterling's default or his right of reentry.85 The trial
court agreed and granted Peterson's motion. 6
The supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings.8 7 The supreme court held that Peterson's acceptance of Easterling's late payments over a period of time may have
constituted a waiver of his right to reenter the premises even though
Easterling's failure to make timely payments constituted default under
the lease.88 Because the court previously decided that under New Mexico
law the existence of a waiver is a factual issue, 89 the court held that
summary judgment was improper. 9° On remand, the trial court needed
to decide as a factual matter whether Peterson waived his right of reentry
by accepting late payments in the past. 9'
The supreme court reached its decision partially by relying on New
Mexico cases decided within the context of insurance and contract law
that have recognized the waiver of certain rights by "a course of conduct." 9 The court also relied on cases from other jurisdictions that held
that non-waivable provisions of lease agreements may be waived by a
course of conduct. 93 Moreover, the court noted that New Mexico law
abhors the forfeiture of contract.9 4 The court thus seemed comfortable
in adopting a policy that would allow waiver of lease provisions that
provide for forfeiture. 95

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 124, 753 P.2d at 903.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 125, 753 P.2d at 904.
88. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court defined waiver as an "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right." Young v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 101 N.M. 545, 547, 685 P.2d
953, 955 (1984).
89. See Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 102, 654
P.2d 548, 555 (1982).
90. Easterling, 107 N.M. at 124, 753 P.2d at 903.
91. Id.
92. Id. For instance, the court relied on its decision in Green v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of
Am., 106 N.M. 523, 746 P.2d 152 (1987). Green held that an insurance company which by its
conduct lulled its insured into reasonably believing that it would settle his claim without suit was
estopped from asserting the right to sue under the policy. Id. at 526, 746 P.2d at 155.
93. Easterling, 107 N.M. at 124, 753 P.2d at 903 (citing Dillingham Commercial Co. v. Spears,
641 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1982); Gonsalves v. Gilbert, 44 Haw. 543, 356 P.2d 379 (1960)).
94. Id. (citing Stamm v. Buchanan, 55 N.M. 127, 227 P.2d 633 1951)).
95. Id.
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In the future, in lease agreements a landlord (or a tenant) can waive
even non-waivable provisions of a lease by a course of conduct. If a
landlord consistently accepts late payments, he may waive his right to
claim a default of the lease contract for untimely payments.
IV.
A.

CONTROLS OF LAND USE

Private Controls of Land Use

1. Creation of a Public Highway by Prescription
A highway can be established by prescription if use by the general
public continues for the length of time necessary for an individual to
obtain prescriptive rights. 96 The public's use must be "open, uninterrupted,
peaceable, notorious, adverse, under a claim of right and continued for
ten years with knowledge or imputed knowledge of the owner." 97 In
recent cases, the New Mexico courts were faced with tangential issues
relating to the public prescription doctrine.
In Herbertson v. Iliff,98 the court of appeals addressed the issue of
who constitutes the public for the purpose of determining whether there
has been public use. The land in dispute was a 1,056 square-foot triangular
parcel located to the west of Herbertson's mobile home park and to the
south of a county road that dead-ended at the entrance to the mobile
home park. 99 Herbertson had paved the disputed parcel so that it was
essentially a widening of the county road at the entrance to the mobile
home park. 00 From 1972 to 1985 tenants, invitees, and guests used this
extended road to access and leave the mobile home park. 0' In 1985 the
United States conveyed to Iliff by U.S. Patent the property located to
the west of the mobile home park and south of the county road. 10 2 Iliff
built a fence, and later a cinder block wall, along the east side of the
paved triangle, such that access to Herbertson's park was narrowed. 013
Herbertson brought an action seeking a declaration of an easement
across the northeast corner of Iliff's parcel and injunctive relief preventing
Iliff from interfering with use of the easement.1 4 The trial court entered
a judgment in favor of Iliff after a trial on the merits but subsequently
granted Herbertson's motion to vacate the judgment and grant a new
trial. 105 After retrial, the trial court granted Herbertson a private easement

96. State ex rel. Baxter v. Egolf, 107 N.M. 315, 318, 757 P.2d 371, 374 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing
Lovelace v. Hightower, 50 N.M. 50, 65, 168 P.2d 864, 873 (1946)).
97. Id. at 318, 757 P.2d at 374 (citing Lovelace, 50 N.M. at 65, 168 P.2d at 873)).
98. 108 N.M. 552, 775 P.2d 754 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 485, 775 P.2d 251 (1989).
99. Id. at 553, 775 P.2d at 755.
100. Appellee's Answer Brief at 1-2, Herbertson. Herbertson needed the extra width so that
mobile homes could be moved in and out of the park. Id.
101. Herbertson, 108 N.M. at 553, 775 P.2d at 755.
102. Id.
103. Id. See also Appellee's Answer Brief at 2.
104. Herbertson, 108 N.M. at 553, 775 P.2d at 755.
105. Id.
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by prescription and enjoined Iliff from interfering with the easement. °6
Iliff appealed, claiming that a private prescriptive easement could not be
established against land owned by a governmental entity. 107 The court of
appeals disposed of this issue by reiterating that New Mexico courts have
long recognized the rule that prescriptive rights cannot be acquired against
the United States.' 08
The court of appeals also considered whether substantial evidence
supported the trial court's finding that the disputed parcel had not been
used in a manner that established the parcel as a public road by adverse
use.' 9 The court of appeals found no error by the trial court as to this
finding," l0 concluding that use of the disputed parcel by tenants, their
guests, business visitors, and others providing services to tenants was not
sufficient to establish a history of general public use of the disputed
property."' Thus, public use for the purpose of creating a public highway
by prescription apparently requires more than use by many individuals
for the single purpose of accessing one tract of private land.
2. Scope of Public Highway Easements
Once a public highway has been established by prescription, questions
may arise concerning the width of the highway. The court addressed this
2
issue in State ex rel. Baxter v. Egolf."
The Old Bishop's Lodge Road had become a public highway by means
of prescription." 3 The Egolfs travelled the Old Bishop's Lodge Road and
then crossed the Baxters' property to access the rear of the Egolfs'
property where the Egolfs were building a dam." 4 Initially, the Baxters
obtained a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the Egolfs from clearing vegetation on the Baxters' land and
from storing construction materials on the Baxters' property." 5 At the
same time, the court found that the Egolfs had benefit of an easement
entitling them to cross the Baxters' property from Old Bishop's Lodge
Road." 6 The Baxters then filed an action and went to trial on the merits
seeking an injunction for continued trespass and relief for private nuisance,
trespass, and property damage." 7 The trial judge found no private nuisance
and refused to enjoin the Egolfs from passing over the Baxters' property."'

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 554, 775 P.2d at 756; see supra note 56 for related discussion of Herbertson.
109. Id. at 555, 775 P.2d at 757. Because the paved area was not a through road but rather
adjoined a dead-ending county road, the parties contested its use by the general public. Amicus
Curiae Brief for the United States of America at 4.
110. Herbertson, 108 N.M. at 555, 775 P.2d at 757.
111. Id.
112. 107 N.M. 315, 757 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1988).
113. Id. at 318, 757 P.2d at 374.
114. Id. at 316, 757 P.2d at 372.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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The trial court found that the Egolfs' property abutted the Old Bishop's
Lodge Road because it was within thirty feet of the center line of the
road." 9 The court then concluded that the Egolfs' status as abutters
Bishop's Lodge Road for ingress and egress. 120
entitled them to use Old
2'
The Baxters appealed.'
Since the Egolfs' right of access depended on the width of the Old
Bishop's Lodge Road, the court of appeals addressed the problem of
how wide a public highway should be when it has been established by
prescription. 2 2 The Egolfs contended that since no width was stated when
Old Bishop's Lodge Road became a state highway, the width must be
sixty feet under the Highway Department Organization Act. 23 The Act
states that all public highways laid out in New Mexico shall be sixty
feet wide.'2 The court held that this statutory width requirement did not
apply to highways established by means of prescriptive use. 25 The court
concluded the evidence showed that the road had never been wider than
eighteen feet. 26 Thus, the Egolfs could be abutters only where their
property was within nine feet of the center line of Old Bishop's Lodge

Road. 127
The majority rule relating to public highways by prescription is that
"where the public has acquired a right by use, the right is not limited
to the width of the beaten path, but is the width reasonably necessary
for public travel.' ' 28 The Baxter opinion does not indicate whether the
court adopted the majority rule. The court did not identify eighteen feet
as being the width of the beaten path or the distance reasonably necessary
for public travel. In Baxter, the court did not consider the width of Old
Bishop's Lodge Road to be wider than the beaten path.
3. Easements and Servitudes
An appurtenant easement may be transferred if the dominant estate
is also transferred. The interest in an appurtenant easement is annexed
to the possession of a dominant estate. 29 Any attempt to sever the
appurtenant easement from the dominant estate will fail. 30 An exception
to the rule applies if the owners of the servient estate agree to an
increased burden on the servient estate.' 13 During the survey period, in

119. Id. at 318, 757 P.2d at 374.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 316, 757 P.2d at 372.
122. Id. at 318, 757 P.2d at 374.
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-2 (1978).
124. Baxter, 107 N.M. at 318-19, 757 P.2d at 374-75; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-2 (1978).
125. Baxter, 107 N.M. at 319, 757 P.2d at 375.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 318, 757 P.2d at 374.
129. Nelson v. Johnson, 106 Idaho 385, 387, 679 P.2d 662, 664 (1984).
130. Id.
131. Cf. Brooks v. Tanner, 101 N.M. 203, 207, 680 P.2d 343, 347 (1984). This exception is
adopted from the rules of easements in general. An owner of an easement cannot alter the dimensions,
location, or use of his easement such that it would increase the burden on the servient estate, unless
the owner of the servient estate agrees to the alteration. Posey v. Dove, 57 N.M. 200, 212, 257
P.2d 541, 548 (1953).
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Kikta v. Hughes,3 2 the court of appeals applied these traditional rules
of appurtenant easements.
The Kiktas and Hughes disagreed as to Hughes' right to use an
undedicated alley in Santa Fe which runs north and south between Paseo
de Peralta (formerly West Manhattan) and Santa Fe Avenue.' The alley
parallels Galisteo and Don Gaspar but is closer to Don Gaspar. 3 4 In
1950 the Abrahams owned the property surrounding the alley.'35 In 1953
36
Gonzales bought 516 and 518 Don Gaspar, which also abutted the alley.
In 1956 the Abrahams granted Gonzales an express easement so Gonzales
could reach the rear of his property. 37 The Abrahams then built a garage
at the south end of the easement; the garage blocked the alley so there
could be no through traffic to Santa Fe Avenue. 3 The garage faced
north such that the only entrance to the garage was by the alley.3 9 The
Abrahams leased the garage to Gonzales for ten years with an automatic
ten-year renewal and a permanent right-of-way easement to the alley and
the garage.1'4 In 1966 the Abrahams conveyed to Hughes a portion of
the Abrahams' property that included the garage leased to Gonzales in
the northeastern corner and the property extending southwest to Santa
Fe Avenue.' 4' Two years later the Abrahams entered into a real estate
contract with the Kiktas for the Kiktas to purchase the remaining northernmost portion of the Abrahams' property subject to easements of
record.'4 2 The Kiktas initially granted Hughes permission to cross their
land but withdrew their permission in 1975 .143 In 1982 Gonzales assigned
use of his easement to Hughes.'"
In 1983 the Kiktas fulfilled their real estate contract with the Abrahams
and brought a quiet title action against Hughes and others. 45 Hughes
claimed Gonzales held an express easement or, in the alternative, an
easement by prescription across the Kiktas' land, and that Gonzales
assigned his right to Hughes.'" The trial court quieted title in the Kiktas. 147

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

108 N.M. 61, 766 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1988).
Record at 94, Kikta.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 96.

140. Id.at 95, 97.
141. Id.
142. Kikta, 108 N.M. at 62, 766 P.2d at 322.
143. Id. at 63, 766 P.2d at 323. Hughes had permissive use until he and his wife, Darthy,
divorced. Darthy was the sister of two of the Kiktas and the daughter of the other Kikta. Record
at 247.
144. Kikta, 108 N.M. at 62, 766 P.2d at 322.
145. Id.
146. Id. In view of its holding that Hughes did not have an easement because an appurtenant
easement cannot be assigned without a transfer of the dominant estate, see infra notes 148-49 and
accompanying text, the court did not decide whether the easement was express or prescriptive. Id.
at 63, 766 P.2d at 323.
147. Id. at 62, 766 P.2d at 322.
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The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 4 The
court held that the assignment of an appurtenant easement from Gonzales
to Hughes was ineffective'4 9 because an appurtenant easement cannot be
assigned unless the dominant estate is also transferred. 5 0 The evidence
did not indicate that Gonzales passed the dominant estate with the
easement.' The record also did not indicate that the Kiktas consented
to the assignment.'5 2 Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Hughes'
easement claim.'
Transferring an appurtenant easement requires adherence to strict procedures; imposing a restrictive obligation requires less formality. In Sharts
v. Walters,5 4 the court of appeals applied the doctrine of implied reciprocal
negative servitudes, an equitable doctrine in force in New Mexico since
1940 but rarely applied. The doctrine has been stated as follows:
If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation,
sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the servitude
becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the owner of
the lot or lots retained can do nothing forbidden to the owner of
the lot sold.' 55
To determine whether a reciprocal negative easement exists, a court
looks at the intent of the parties as evidenced by the language of the
restrictions, the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the object
of the parties in making the restrictions. 5 6 Once the court is convinced
that a parcel of land is bound by a restrictive covenant, the next step
is to determine whether the violator of the covenant had actual or
constructive notice of it. 17 If the violator had notice, then he is bound
by the covenant.
In Sharts, a plaintiff owned two contiguous tracts of land. 5 8 Tract A
consisted of 60 acres, and Tract B, located to the south of Tract A,
consisted of 15.044 acres. 5 9 In 1978 Sharts conveyed the northern 30
acres of Tract A (Tract A-N) to some of the defendants and to the
grantors of the other defendants. '° Most of the deeds to these individuals
referred to a Declaration of Restrictive Covenants (declaration) that was

148. Id.
149. Id. at 63, 766 P.2d at 323. Hughes did not dispute that the claimed easement was an
appurtenant easement. Id.
150. Id. The owner of a dominant estate can neither separate an appurtenant easement from the
dominant estate nor can he allow other land to be benefitted by the easement without the consent
of the owners of the servient estate. Id. at 64, 766 P.2d at 324; Brooks v. Tanner, 101 N.M. 203,
207, 680 P.2d 343, 347 (1984).
151. Id. at 63, 766 P.2d at 323.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 64, 766 P.2d at 324.
154. 107 N.M. 414, 759 P.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1988).
155. Rowe v. May, 44 N.M. 264, 273, 101 P.2d 391, 397 (1940).
156. Hines Corp. v. City of Albuquerque, 95 N.M. 311, 313, 621 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1980).
157. Rowe, 44 N.M. at 273, 101 P.2d at 397.
158. Sharts, 107 N.M. at 415, 759 P.2d at 202.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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filed in 1978.161 This declaration restricted the land to single family
residences on lots no smaller than three acres.1 62 Sharts attempted to
develop the land he retained in the southern portion of Tract A (Tract
A-S) contrary to the restrictive covenants in the declaration. 63 Sharts
64
later conveyed Tract A-S and Tract B to most of the other plaintiffs.' 65
None of the deeds to these conveyances referred to the declaration.'
The title insurance policies for these conveyances, however, contained
exceptions for the effect of the declaration. 16
Following a failed attempt to modify the covenants, Sharts and other
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Tract A-S and Tract B
were not bound by the declaration. 67 The trial court ruled that Tract
A-S161 was subject to the declaration but that Tract B was not subject
to the declaration. 169 Plaintiffs and defendants appealed the portions of
the judgment unfavorable to them. 70 The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court.'71
The issue before the court of appeals was whether the restrictions in
the declaration applied to the tracts originally retained by Sharts and
later conveyed to plaintiffs (Tract A-S and Tract B). 72 The court of
appeals held that "where the owner of a tract subdivides and sells under
a general plan of restriction, it may be shown from the terms of the
instrument, as well as from the situation and surrounding circumstances,
that the grantor intended to impose reciprocal restrictions."'' 73 Testimony
about Sharts' representations to buyers that Tract A was bound by the
declaration, that defendants relied upon Sharts' representations when they
purchased their lots, and that Sharts' "Dear Investor" letter and presale agreement indicated he intended to follow a general plan of development all supported the existence of a general development plan for
Tract A. 74 Thus, the doctrine of implied restrictive covenants applied to
75
Tract A-S.

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Reference to Tract A-S will assume hereinafter that a two-acre parcel where a restaurant
was located was excepted from the declaration restrictions.
169. Sharts, 107 N.M. at 415-16, 759 P.2d at 202-03.
170. Id. at 416, 759 P.2d at 203.
171. Id. at 420, 759 P.2d at 207.
172. Id. at 416, 759 P.2d at 203.
173. Id. at 417, 759 P.2d at 204.
174. Id. at 418, 759 P.2d at 205.
175. Id. The court of appeals noted that the intent and object of the parties in making the
restrictions govern over the "rule that ambiguities concerning restrictive covenants should be resolved
in favor of the free enjoyment of the property and against restrictions." Id. at 419, 759 P.2d at
206.
Regarding Tract B, the witnesses' testimonies were conflicting. Id. at 419-20, 759 P.2d 206-07.
There was disagreement concerning Tract B's intended use. Id. The court of appeals accepted the
trial court's judgment that the restrictions did not apply to Tract B, finding that the trial court's

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

4.

[Vol. 20

Nuisance

A private nuisance is a "non-trespassory invasion of another's interest

in the private use and enjoyment of land. 1 7 6 When the conduct of the
defendant is intentional, the plaintiff must also prove that the conduct
is unreasonable.1 77 During the survey period the court of appeals considered
whether violating a zoning ordinance is automatically 178unreasonable con-

nuisance.
duct for the purposes of proving a 7private
80
9
In State ex rel. Baxter v. Egolf, discussed earlier in this article,

the Baxters claimed, among other things, that the Egolfs' intentional
construction of a dam at the rear of the Egolfs' property was a private
nuisance to the Baxters.18 ' The Baxters attempted to show that the Egolfs'
conduct was unreasonable in part by showing that the Egolfs were violating

a zoning ordinance. 8 2 The trial court found no violation of the zoning

ordinance and no private nuisance.8 3 The court of appeals affirmed the

trial court's decision that the Egolfs were not violating a zoning ordi-

nance. 8 4 The court also pointed out that even if the Egolfs had violated
the evidence before the trial court supported a finding
a zoning ordinance,
85

of no nuisance.
In reaching this conclusion, the court found that compliance or noncompliance with controlling governmental regulations is not dispositive
on the question of whether a private nuisance exists. 8 6 The information
is, however, a persuasive factor in determining whether an activity is
unreasonable.8 7 The court noted that if the trial court had found a
violation of a zoning ordinance by the Egolfs, such a determination
would only be one factor in determining the existence of a private

nuisance. 181

decision was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 420, 759 P.2d at 207.
The court of appeals did not discuss the second step of a reciprocal negative easement inquiry:
whether plaintiff-buyers (other than Sharts) had notice of the restrictions. The court probably
accepted the trial court's finding that plaintiffs had constructive notice of the restrictions by Sharts'
recordation of the declaration, and the plaintiffs also had actual knowledge of the declaration by
virtue of the exceptions in their title insurance policies. Id. at 417, 759 P.2d at 204.
176. Scott v. Jordan, 99 N.M. 567, 570, 661 P.2d 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979)).
177. Id. at 570, 661 P.2d at 62.
178. This issue had been discussed in numerous jurisdictions but not in New Mexico. State ex
rel. Baxter v. Egolf, 107 N.M. 315, 317, 757 P.2d 371, 373 (Ct. App. 1988).
179. 107 N.M. 315, 757 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1988).
180. See supra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
181. Baxter, 107 N.M. at 316, 757 P.2d at 372.
182. Id. at 317, 757 P.2d at 373.
183. Id.at 316, 757 P.2d at 372.
184. Id.at 319, 757 P.2d at 375.
185. Id. at 318, 757 P.2d at 374.
186. Id.
187. Id. The test for unreasonableness for the purpose of determining a nuisance iswhether "the
gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct or if the harm caused by the
conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for the harm would not make continuing
the conduct unfeasible." Padilla v. Lawrence, 101 N.M. 556, 560, 685 P.2d 964, 968 (Ct. App.
1984) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) and (b) (1979)).
188. Baxter, 107 N.M. at 318, 757 P.2d at 374. In this case, evidence considered by the trial
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Another case decided during the survey period discussed the proof
needed to show that vegetation is a nuisance. Previously, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held:
that non-noxious plants ordinarily are not nuisances; ... that roots
which interfere only with other plant life are not nuisances; that
overhanging branches or protruding roots constitute a nuisance only
when they actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing,
sensible harm to property other than plant life . . .; that when overhanging branches or protruding roots actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, sensible harm to property other than
plant life, .

..

the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may

require,the owner of the tree to pay for the damages and to cut
back the endangering branches -or roots..
119
Thus, vegetation does not become a nuisance until it substantially causes
harm to property other than plant life or until it creates an immediate
danger of causing harm to property other than plant life. The court of
appeals discussed and applied this rule in Garcia v. Sanchez.' 9°
Once the court of appeals found that the common boundary line rule
did not apply to the tree trunks' overgrowth on Garcia's property, 9' the
court addressed whether the trial court properly directed Sanchez to
trench and trim the trees yearly at her expense and whether it properly
awarded damages to Garcia. 92 The court of appeals held that the trial
court erred. 193 Because Garcia did not allege nuisance, and her evidence
of damages was limited to proof of damage to plant life, Garcia should
not have been awarded damages. 194
B.

Public Controls of Land Use
Under the New Mexico Constitution, a county shall not borrow money
for "erecting, remodeling and making additions to necessary public buildings" unless the majority of voters in the county have approved the
expenditure. 95 The language in the constitution leaves open the question
of whether a lease to construct a public building is an expenditure. In
Montano v. Gabaldon,'96 the supreme court addressed the issue of whether
a county could enter into a lease for a county jail without voter approval.

court besides the allegations of zoning violations included the safety of the dam, its aesthetics, and
any reduction in the value of the Baxters' property. Id. See also Padilla, 101 N.M. at 560, 685
P.2d at 964 nn.l & 2, for a list of factors relevant when determining unreasonableness.
189. Abbinett v. Fox, 103 N.M. 80, 84, 703 P.2d 177, 181 (Ct. App), cert. quashed, 103 N.M.
62, 702 P.2d 1007 (1985) (emphasis in original).
190. Garcia v. Sanchez, 108 N.M. 388, 394, 772 P.2d 1311, 1317 (Ct. App. 1989).
191. Id. at 392, 772 P.2d at 1315; see supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text for the facts
of Garcia and a discussion of the common boundary line rule.
192. Id. at 393, 772 P.2d at 1316.
193. Id. at 396, 772 P.2d at 1319.
194. Id. at 394, 772 P.2d at 1317.
195. N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
196. 108 N.M. 94, 766 P.2d 1328 (1989).
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Valencia County voters twice voted not to finance a new county jail.197
Because the Valencia County Commission could not obtain voter approval
to finance a new jail, the Commission entered into a Lease with Option
to Purchase Agreement (lease) with a private corporation for the use of
a new jail. 19 The lease provided that the jail be constructed on countyowned land and that the county make semi-annual rent payments for
the use of the facility. 199 The lease further provided that the private
corporation would hold title, not only to the facility and its fixtures,
but also to the land until and unless the county exercised its option to
purchase. 2 m The county could exercise its option either by complying with
an amortization schedule of payments laid out in the lease or by making
the scheduled rental payments for twenty years. 20 1 Moreover, the lease
provided that if the Board of County Commissioners failed to appropriate
20 2
sufficient funds to pay the rent the lease would automatically terminate.
Failure to make scheduled rental payments within ten business days,
failure to abide by certain covenants, or filing for voluntary bankruptcy
could also terminate the lease, leaving title to the jail and to the land
20 3
in the private corporation.
A Valencia County Commissioner, Montano, brought suit in district
court seeking a declaratory judgment that the lease violated article IX,
section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution because it created county
24
indebtedness for the erection of a public building without voter approval . 0
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valencia County,
finding that the lease did not create indebtedness within the meaning of
20 5
article IX, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.
Montano appealed. The supreme court reversed and remanded the case
to the district court.
Valencia County argued that the lease did not create an unconstitutional
debt because it did not legally oblige the county to continue the indebtedness from year to year. 2 Montano contended, and the supreme
court agreed, that once the county accepted the lease it would be obligated
to make rental payments to protect its growing equitable interest in the
facility. "207 The court found this lease to be exactly the type of economic
indebtedness that requires voter approval. 20 8 The court further stated that
"this ruling shall have modified prospective effect only. ' ' 20 9 Specifically,

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
enter into

at 95, 766 P.2d at 1329.

at 94, 766 P.2d at 1328.
at 96, 766 P.2d at 1330.
The court recognized that the New Mexico Legislature has provided that counties may
lease purchase agreements in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-12 (1978). Id. The court also
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the ruling does not apply to situations where a lease is already in effect.
The ruling, however, severely limits the ability of political subdivisions
to enter into lease arrangements without voter approval.
V.

VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF INTERESTS IN REAL
PROPERTY

A.

Gifts
An oral conveyance of real property is generally not enforceable under
the statute of frauds. 210 As an exception to this rule, an oral contract
to sell real property may be enforced where there has been part performance under the contract to such an extent that it would be inequitable
to deny enforcement. 21 In Montoya v. New Mexico Human Services
2 12
the court of appeals created an additional exception, holdDepartment,
ing that an oral promise to give real property is enforceable where
improvements have been made on the property in reliance on the promise
to such an extent that it would be inequitable to deny the promise.
The Montoyas first became eligible for food stamps in 1985.213 To be
eligible for food stamps, a claimant cannot have an accessible resource
valued in excess of $3,000.214 In 1986 the New Mexico Human Services
Department (HSD) discovered that Maria Montoya held legal title to land
which had not been reported to HSD. 215 After investigation, HSD notified
the Montoyas that their benefits would be terminated. 21 6 The hearing
officer ruled that because Maria had legal title to the land, the household
had an accessible resource valued in excess of $3,000 and termination
21 s
of benefits was proper. 217 HSD affirmed the hearing officer's decision.
an accessible
The Montoyas appealed, claiming that the land was not
219
resource because Maria did not have title to the land.
Maria's parents made an oral gift of the property to her in 1973. 0
The parents intended the land to be part of Maria's inheritance but also
intended the land to be presently enjoyed. 22' Maria received a deed to
the property in 1976 after her brothers quitclaimed their interest in the

recognized that the statute relies on a 1976 Attorney General's Opinion which misconstrued language
of earlier decisions. Id. (citing State Office Bldg. Commission v. Trujillo, 46 N.M. 29, 120 P.2d
434 (1941); State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm'n v. Connelly, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P.2d 1097
(1935); Att'y Gen. Op. No. 20 (1976)).
210. Montoya v. Human Servs. Dep't, 108 N.M. 263, 266, 771 P.2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1989).
211. Id. (citing Shipp v. Thomas, 58 N.M. 190, 269 P.2d 741 (1954)).
212. 108 N.M. 263, 771 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1989).
213. Id.
214. 7 C.F.R. § 273.8(e)(8) (1987). A resource is accessible only where the household has a right
to the cash value of the resource. Id.
215. Montoya, 108 N.M. at 263, 771 P.2d at 196.
216. Id. at 263-64, 771 P.2d at 196-97.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 264, 771 P.2d at 197.
219. Id. at 263, 771 P.2d at 196.
220. Id. at 264, 771 P.2d at 197.
221. Id.
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property to her. 222 After Maria received legal title, she observed the same
tradition her parents had observed and told her son and daughter that
the property belonged to them. 223 The children relied on the oral conveyance, built major permanent improvements on their respective portions
Maria did not
of the property, and paid all taxes on the225property.
exercise authority or control over the land.
The court of appeals found the oral conveyance gave Maria's children
a claim of equitable title to the property and that Maria held legal title
subject to her children's equitable claim. 226 The court found no reason
to treat an oral promise to give real property different from an oral
contract to sell real property. 227 The court found that there was no
essential difference between the circumstances that make it inequitable
to deny enforcement of an oral contract to sell real property and those
circumstances that make it inequitable to refuse to enforce a promise to
give real property. " s It applied the equitable rule of promissory estoppel
to enforce Maria's oral gift, finding that Maria's children built major
improvements and paid all taxes on the property in reliance on the gift
such that it would be inequitable to deny enforcement of the gift. 229
Thus, the court held that an oral gift of real property in New Mexico
230
is enforceable if there is proof of the elements of promissory estoppel.
After the Montoya decision, an oral gift of real property will be
enforceable in New Mexico if the elements of promissory estoppel are
proved. New Mexico's approval of this exception to the rule that oral
conveyances are unenforceable follows similar developments in other

jurisdictions .231
B.

Deed Construction
Several cases this survey period addressed issues of deed construction.
The cases involved not only ambiguous legal descriptions within deeds
but also ambiguous deeds which might be construed as mortgages.
In Padilla v. City of Santa Fe,23 2 the court of appeals construed an
ambiguous legal description which arose from a call to a natural mon-

222. Id.
223. Id. Maria's son testified that the attempted oral gift occurred in 1976, while Maria's daughter
testified that the gift occurred in 1978. Maria testified that the attempted gift occurred in 1977.
The court did not find the variation in dates important. Id.
224. Id. Maria's son dug a well and built a home. Maria's daughter built a garage and planned
to build a home. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 267, 771 P.2d at 200.
227. Id. at 266, 771 P.2d at 199.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 266-67, 771 P.2d at 199-200. Under promissory estoppel, an oral promise will be
enforced where a person has acted in reliance on the promise to such an extent that it would be
inequitable to deny enforcement. See Eavenson v. Lewis Means, Inc., 105 N.M. 161, 730 P.2d 464
(1986).
231. See, e.g., Lindvig v. Lindvig, 385 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1986); Locke v. Pyle, 349 So. 2d 813
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
232. 107 N.M. 107, 753 P.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1988).
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ument. Ordinarily, when a natural monument is used as a boundary in
a deed, the middle of the natural monument constitutes the boundary
line. 233 When use of the monument as a boundary creates an ambiguity,
a court will consider all the circumstances surrounding the conveyance
at the time it occurred. 23 4 When the description to a natural monument
in a deed is uncertain, the court may use extrinsic evidence to ascertain
the grantor's intentions as to that description.21 In Padilla, the court
held that the lower court's reliance on maps and surveys not referred
23 6
to in the grants was an improper use of extrinsic evidence.
The parcel of land at issue in Padilla lay on the side of the hill north
of present day Alameda Street in Santa Fe. 23 7 The Padillas argued it was
part of land conveyed in 1930 which the deed described as grounded on
the south by the Santa Fe River and on the north by the hills. 23 The
land was conveyed again, using the same natural monuments as boundaries
and further describing the property as "266 yards in length from the
hill of Alameda Street. ' 239 In 1937 or 1938, Alameda Street was extended
into and through the property.m In 1942, a parcel bounded on the north
by the hills and on the south by Alameda Street and described as 180
feet in depth was conveyed to the predecessors-in-interest of the Padillas. 24'
The city contended, and the trial court agreed, that the 1930 conveyance
included only land to the foot of the hills. 242 Therefore, the Padilla's
predecessors never owned the parcel above Alameda Street and could
3
not convey it to the Padillas .
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in preferring a
call for distance over the call "to the hills." 2 " The court of appeals
determined that, in its attempt to interpret the call to the hills, the trial
court had in effect altered the description of the 1930 deed because it
relied on maps extrinsic to the deed to establish a call for distance in
that deed. 245
The dispositive issue, therefore, was whether there was a local standard
for the use of a call "to the hills" different from the rule of construction
as to monuments. 24 Finding no local standard, 247 the court held that the

233. Id. at 110, 753 P.2d at 356 (citing Gentile v. Crossan, 7 N.M. 589, 597-98, 38 P. 247, 249
(1894)).
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing Garcia v. Garcia, 86 N.M. 503, 525 P.2d 863 (1974)).
236. Id. at 109, 753 P.2d at 357.
237. Id. at 108, 753 P.2d at 354.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 109, 753 P.2d at 355.
241. Id. at 108, 753 P.2d at 354.
242. Id. at 108-09, 753 P.2d at 354-55.
243. Id.The trial court relied on maps, surveys, and probable usage of the land. Id. Measurements
of the distance were contradictory. Defendant's surveyor estimated the distance from the river to
the foot of the hills to be 333 yards. Id. at 111, 753 P.2d at 357.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 110-11, 753 P.2d at 356-57.
246. Id. at 111, 753 P.2d at 357.
247. Id.
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rules of construction-a call to a monument controls over a call to
of the object defines the line-decide the issue. 24

distance and the middle
In another case during the survey period, the New Mexico courts
addressed a similar rule of construction. The rule applies where an
inconsistency exists between a call to an adjacent boundary and a call
for distance. 249 The rule is based on the preference for the more definite
call. 250 In Maestas v. Martinez2 1 the court of appeals addressed an

exception to this general rule.
In 1919 Pedro Salazar owned a thirty-six acre parcel that measured

231 yards wide from north to south. 2 2 Seven years later Pedro conveyed
25 3

to his son, Gregorio Salazar, the southernmost ninety yards of the parcel.
In 1951 Pedro executed a will bequeathing his residence and one-half of

his real property to Agueda Martinez, one of his daughters. 25 4 He be-

queathed the other half of his real property to his other children, Gregorio,
Angela S. Talamante, and Ignacia Salazar, to divide equally. 2"1But one
year after executing the will, Pedro executed four deeds, one to each of
his children, conveying all of the thirty-six acre parcel except the ninety
southernmost yards previously conveyed to Gregorio. 256 The 1952 deed

to Gregorio described his parcel as fifteen and two-third yards wide,
bounded on the north by a known and undisputed boundary and on the
south by Angela's deeded land. 257 The deed to Angela, in turn, described

her parcel as fifteen yards wide, bounded on the north by Gregorio's

deeded land and on the south by Ignacia's deeded land. 25 Ignacia's

property was likewise described as fifteen yards wide, bounded on the
north by Angela's deeded land and on the south by Agueda's deeded
land. 2 9 Finally, the deed to Agueda described her parcel as seventy-three
yards wide, bounded on the north by Ignacia's deeded land and on the
south by the northern border of the ninety yard wide property deeded
to Gregorio in 1926.2 60 The total yardage conveyed in the 1926 deed to
Gregorio and the four deeds executed in 1952 was 208 yards. 61 Twentythree yards, the difference between the 208 yards and the amount originally
conveyed to Pedro, was the subject of the dispute between Eufemia
Maestas, Gregorio's daughter, and Agueda Martinez, Pedro's daughter. 262

248. Id. at 112, 753 P.2d at 358.
249. Maestas v. Martinez, 107 N.M. 91, 94, 752 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Olivas
v. Garcia, 64 N.M. 419, 329 P.2d 435 (1958)).
250. Id.
251. 107 N.M. 91, 752 P.2d 1107 (Ct. App. 1988).
252. Id. at 92, 752 P.2d at 1108.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 92-93, 752 P.2d at 1108-09.
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The trial court found that the deed from Pedro to Agueda was vague
and ambiguous. 263 The court further found that all of the deeds executed
in 1952 were prepared based on a mistake of fact as to the width in
yards of the property. 26 Finally, the court found that Pedro meant to
convey all of his remaining real property in accordance with his will
through the deeds.265 Therefore, the trial court found that Pedro intended
to give Agueda one-half of the disputed property and to give the other
2
half to Eufemia's predecessors-in-interest, Gregorio, Angela and Ignacia. 6
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the deed descriptions were
not sufficient to convey the disputed parcel of land and therefore it was
subject to the operation of Pedro's will. 267 The trial court found, and
the court of appeals agreed, that Pedro intended to convey all the property
he owned. 268 The court of appeals could not, however, prefer a call to
a boundary over a call for distance because the boundaries within the
deeds were no more certain than the calls for distance. 269 The court,
furthermore, disagreed with the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's
gift under the will was satisfied by ademption when the defendant was
deeded more than one half the property in 1952.270 The court of appeals
thus decided the dispute between Eufemia and Agueda by applying the
parcel, dividing it equally between the
terms of the will to the disputed
27
plaintiff and the defendant. '
Deed construction cases during the survey period not only covered
ambiguous legal descriptions within documents, but also addressed the
purpose of a deed. Specifically, the court of appeals addressed the issue
of whether a deed could ever operate as a mortgage. 2 2 In 1942 the Town
of Chilil Grant sold its common lands to the Chilili Cooperative Association. 27 31 The Association incorporated to obtain a loan from the
Farmers Home Administration of the United States Department of Agriculture. 274 The Association used the loan proceeds to redeem some of
which had previously been sold to the state for dethe common land
275
linquent taxes.
The owners of individual tracts also conveyed their land to the Association by quitclaim deeds. 276 The owners of these individual tracts were

263. Id. at 93, 752 P.2d 1109.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 93-94, 752 P.2d at 1109-10.
266. Id. at 93, 752 P.2d at 1109. Plaintiff succeeded to the interests of her father and the other
two children. Id. at 92, 752 P.2d at 1108.
267. Id. at 95, 96, 752 P.2d at 1111, 1112.
268. Id.at 94, 752 P.2d at 1110.
269. Id. at 95, 752 P.2d at 111.
270. Id. Real property is not satisfied by ademption. Id. (citing In re Williams' Will, 71 N.M.
39, 64, 376 P.2d 3, 20 (1962)).
271. Id.at 96, 752 P.2d at 1112.
272. Toulouse v. Chilili Coop. Ass'n, 108 N.M. 220, 770 P.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1989).
273. Id. at 221, 770 P.2d at 543.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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given ten years to pay the assessment levied against their lands by the
Association. 277 Upon payment, the owners were to receive quitclaim deeds
from the Association containing the new description of their original
property taken from the survey.27 279The assessment amounted to each
landowner's share of the mortgage.
In Toulouse v. Chilili CooperativeAssociation,2 0 the individual property
owners brought a quiet title suit in district court. The land to which
they claimed ownership was within the boundaries of the tract originally
conveyed to the Town of Chilili Grant by a patent from the United
States. 2 1 The Association argued that the quitclaim deeds it gave to
individual owners in return for payment of the assessment did not provide
individual owners with fee simple title to the property in dispute.2 82 The
individual property owners prevailed in the quiet title action by asserting
and proving that the deeds given to the Association in 1942 were in the
nature of mortgages, and thus the individual property owners were never
284
without title to the properties in question. 283 The Association appealed.
The Association argued that the conveyances by the individual property
owners converted their land into the common land of the Association. 285
According to the Association, the right of the owners to receive quitclaim
deeds back from the Association in return for payment of the assessment
28 6
did not provide the owners with any title to the property in dispute.
The Association further argued that the deeds to the Association could
not be mortgages because the court must respect the nature of the
instrument and the language used in the instrument. 28 7 The individual
property owners asserted on appeal that the conveyance of their property
to the Association was in the nature of a mortgage to secure pro rata
payments of the cost of redeeming the lands and the cost of a suit to
288
quiet title brought in the name of the Association.
The court of appeals agreed with the individual property owners.
According to the court, circumstances surrounding the conveyance of the
quitclaim deeds from the individual property owners to the Association
suggested an intent to convey mortgages rather than full title to the
land. 2 9 Specifically, the purpose of the conveyance of the quitclaim deeds
was to help the Association provide additional collateral to the Farmers
29
Home Administration for the loan it was granting to the Association. 0

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id.
Id.
Id.
108
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

N.M. 220, 770 P.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1989).
at 221, 770 P.2d at 543.
at 220-21, 770 P.2d at 542-43.
at 221, 770 P.2d at 543.
at 223, 770 P.2d at 545.
at 222, 770 P.2d at 544.
at 222-23, 770 P.2d at 544-45.
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The Association needed the money to redeem land sold to the state for
delinquent taxes. 291 The payment the owners made to the Association was
calculated by each individual's share of the cost
of redeeming the land,
292
not by the value of the individual's property.
Given the circumstances surrounding the conveyances, the court found
substantial evidence that the property owners granted the deeds to provide
the Association with additional collateral so the Association could obtain
the loan needed to pay off the delinquent taxes and reclaim the common
land from the state. 293 Although the Farmers Home Administration may
have required deeds absolute in form before it would lend the Association
money, the conveyances appeared to be mortgages "securing expenditures
' 294
to protect or increase the value of the grantor's own allotments.
Although the court acknowledged that proving a deed to be a mortgage
is a difficult task, the court found that the district court did not err in
concluding that the individual property owners had met their burden of
proof. 295 Toulouse makes clear that if a transaction conveying land by
deed suggests a conditional sale, or the transaction indicates indebtedness
running from the grantor to the grantee, the deed may be construed as
a mortgage.
The final deed construction case in this survey addresses the question
of what constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation. In Gartley
v. Ricketts, 29 the supreme court was faced with a deed that contained,
among other restrictions, a preemption right. The deed granted a preemption right to defendant or defendant's heirs. 29 Specifically, neither
Irene Gartley, nor her heirs could sell or lease property deeded to her
by Louise Cunningham unless that property was first offered to Phyllis
298
Ricketts or her heirs.
The trial court found that this deed violated the rule against perpetuities
and created an unreasonable restraint on alienation. 29 Although the supreme court held there was no violation of the rule against perpetuities, 3 °°
the court affirmed the trial court's finding that the deed created an
30 1
unreasonable restraint on alienation.
The court delineated six factors tending to support a conclusion that
a restraint is reasonable: (1)the party imposing the restraint has some

291. Id. at 223, 770 P.2d at 545.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 222-23, 770 P.2d at 544-45.
294. Id. at 223, 770 P.2d at 545.
295. Id. at 222, 770 P.2d at 544.
296. 107 N.M. 451, 760 P.2d 143 (1988).
297. Id. at 453, 760 P.2d at 145.
298. Id. at 452, 760 P.2d at 144.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 453, 760 P.2d at 145. The supreme court noted that New Mexico has adopted the
wait and see rule and that New Mexico courts possess the power of cy pres. Id. (citing Minzner,
Property Law, 14 N.M.L. REv. 189, 205 (1984)). The supreme court concluded that the trial court
erred in its holding that the deed violated the rule against perpetuities because the actual event of
Cunningham's death had occurred and the sale had taken place before 21 years of the life in being.
Id.
301. Id. at 454, 760 P.2d at 146.
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interest in land which he is seeking to protect by the enforcement of the
restraint; (2) the restraint is limited in duration; (3) the enforcement of
the restraint accomplishes a worthwhile purpose; (4) the type of conveyances prohibited are ones not likely to be employed to any substantial
degree by the one restrained; (5) the number of persons to whom alienation
is prohibited is small; (6) the one upon whom the restraint is imposed
is a charity.30 2 The court found that the unlimited duration of the restraint
and the large number of people prohibited from alienation made this
restraint unreasonable because the only stated purpose was to keep the
property in the family.30 3 New Mexico property law previously had no
such guide to determine unreasonable restraint on alienation.
C. Mortgages
°4
The statutory redemption period in a foreclosure action is nine months
Parties to an instrument may agree to shorten the redemption period to
not less than one month. 05 The courts have interpreted the phrase "parties
to an instrument" to mean "parties to a mortgage." 3° Therefore, parties
to a mortgage may reduce the redemption period. In Sun Country Savings
Bank v. McDowell, °7 the supreme court held that a shortened redemption
period passes on to a subsequent junior lienholder.
The McDowells executed a promissory note with Sun Country Savings
Bank.308 A mortgage on commercial property executed in favor of Sun
Country secured the note. °9 The mortgage contained a clause which
reduced the redemption period to one month.31 0 When the McDowells
failed to make payments due on the note, Sun Country filed a complaint
for debt and money due and for foreclosure.31" ' Sun Country later amended
the complaint to include as defendants The Bank of Santa Fe, which
held a second mortgage on the property, Omega Group Architects, which
filed a claim of lien against the property, and M.O.B., a joint venture,
which had filed a transcript of judgment on the property growing out
of a different transaction with the McDowells. 1 2 The trial court issued
orders allowing the mortgage liens of Sun Country and The Bank of
Santa Fe to be foreclosed, establishing the priority of all creditors' liens,
and limiting M.O.B. to a one-month redemption period.3" 3

302. Id. at 454, 760 P.2d at 146.
303. Id. at 454-55, 760 P.2d at 146-47.
304. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-18(A)(1) (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
305. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-19 (1978).
306. Sun Country Says. Bank of N.M. v. McDowell, 108 N.M. 528, 533, 775 P.2d 730, 735
(1989) (citing First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Contrends, Inc., 90 N.M. 33, 34, 559 P.2d 410,
411 (1977)).
307. 108 N.M. 528, 775 P.2d 730 (1989).
308. Id. at 530, 775 P.2d at 732.
309. Id.
310. Id. The mortgage provided: "If this mortgage is foreclosed, the redemption period shall be
one month in lieu of nine months." Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 530-31, 775 P.2d at 732-33.
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M.O.B., a junior judgment lienholder, contended on appeal that it
was entitled to the nine-month statutory redemption period.3 14 The supreme
court rejected M.O.B.'s argument and held that M.O.B. had only the
one-month period in which to redeem." 5 The court reasoned that it would
be illogical to find that mortgagees were permitted to reduce their redemption period to one month while all other subsequent junior lienholders
31 6
claiming an interest through the mortgagee had a nine-month period.
Further, the court reasoned, M.O.B. took its judgment lien against the
property subject to Sun Country's recorded mortgage, and M.O.B. had
constructive notice of the reduced right of redemption which might
affect
3 17
junior lienholders claiming an interest through the McDowells.
The Sun Country decision should put junior lienholders on notice that
they are entitled only to the redemption period agreed upon by the parties
to a recorded first mortgage.
VI.

RECORDING

Two cases decided in the survey period addressed issues concerning
unrecorded instruments. One case discussed constructive knowledge of
unrecorded instruments referred to in a recorded instrument or attached
to a recorded instrument. The other case discussed the application of
the rule of constructive notice by possession to judgment lien creditors.18
3
New Mexico's statutes concerning records affecting real property
provide that an unrecorded instrument will not affect the rights or title
to property unless the purchaser has knowledge of the unrecorded instrument.31 9 A purchaser without actual knowledge may be held to have
constructive knowledge of an unrecorded instrument. 32 A purchaser may
also be held to have constructive knowledge if he is on inquiry notice
as to the existence of an unrecorded document.3 2' New Mexico's test for
whether a purchaser is on inquiry notice is whether the purchaser inquired
322
of facts he should have inquired about in the exercise of ordinary care.
The purchaser is charged with knowledge of all the facts which a reasonable inquiry would have revealed. 23 The supreme court has held that
a purchaser has constructive notice of an unrecorded document if a
324
recorded document refers to the unrecorded document.
32
5
In Camino Real Enterprises v. Ortega, the supreme court considered
whether a subsequent purchaser of one parcel of land was on inquiry

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 532-33, 775 P.2d at 734-35.
Id. at 533, 775 P.2d at 735.
Id.
Id. at 534, 775 P.2d at 736.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-9-1 to -9 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-9-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
See Taylor v. Hanchett Oil Co., 37 N.M. 606, 609, 27 P.2d 59, 60 (1933).
Sawyer v. Barton, 55 N.M. 479, 485-86, 236 P.2d 77, 81 (1951).
Id.
Id.
Taylor, 37 N.M. at 609, 27 P.2d at 61.
107 N.M. 387, 758 P.2d 801 (1988).
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notice and bound by an unrecorded improvement agreement that was
referred to in or attached to a recorded contract of sale for another
parcel of land. The common grantor-subdivider-owner, Roadrunner Enterprises, Inc., initially sold Block 15 of the Majestic Hills subdivision
in Las Cruces to the Pattons.3 26 Roadrunner and the Pattons entered
into an improvement agreement requiring the Pattons, their successors,
and assigns to reimburse Roadrunner for a pro rata share of the cost
of any improvements made in the subdivision. 27 Neither party recorded
the agreement.32s The Pattons later conveyed Block 15 to Pacheco; Pacheco
sold it to Hayes; and in June 1985 Hayes sold it to the Ortegas, the
defendants.129 The deeds in these subsequent conveyances did not refer
to the improvement agreement. 3 0 In 1975, however, Roadrunner sold all
of its remaining unsold lots to Camino Real Enterprises, Inc.331 One of
32
the attachments to the contract of sale was the improvement agreement.
The contract of sale with attachments was recorded in 1980, prior to
the Ortegas' 1985 purchase of Block 15. 333
Camino Real sued the Pattons and the Ortegas for breach of the
improvement agreement, requesting damages for reimbursement of the
34
pro rata cost of improvements Camino Real placed on the Ortegas' lot.
The district court found in favor of the Ortegas and the Pattons, ruling
that the recorded contract of sale, which referred to the unrecorded
improvement agreement,
was not in the Ortegas' chain of title.3 35 Camino
33 6
Real appealed.
The supreme court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter
a judgment in favor of Camino Real for the cost of improvements as
provided for in the Roadrunner-Patton improvement agreement. 3 7 The
court found that the contract of sale was in the Ortegas' chain of title,
that the Ortegas had constructive notice of the improvement agreement
and that they were bound by it."' The court stated that the Ortegas
326. Id. at 387-88, 758 P.2d at 801-02.
327. Id. at 388, 758 P.2d at 802.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. The opinion does not clearly state whether Camino Real stands for the proposition that
a recorded deed or contract of sale for the conveyance of one parcel of land that has a covenant
affecting another parcel of land owned by a common grantor is constructive notice to the subsequent
purchaser of the latter parcel. See generally 4 AamRIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.24 (1952); 7
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 3170 (Repl. 1962). This holding appears unlikely because the court
does not cite to any authority relating to such a significant rule. Instead, the court cites to Taylor
v. Hanchett Oil Co. and Sawyer v. Barton, see supra notes 320-24, New Mexico cases dealing with
inquiry notice of restrictions affecting the same parcel of land. In light of this cited authority,
Camino Real may simply stand for the proposition that a subsequent purchaser is not required to
search for encumbrances by a common grantor which appear in another recorded deed or contract
of sale for a different parcel of land, but if he locates such a document he has a duty to read it
and its attachments.
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were bound by the terms of any documents referred to and attached to
the contract of sale from Roadrunner to Camino Real.33 9
In another case the court applied the rule of constructive notice by
possession to judgment lien creditors. 314 Generally, unrecorded instruments
do not affect the title to real property in New Mexico unless a purchaser,
a mortgagee in good faith, or a judgment lien creditor has knowledge
of the unrecorded instrument.3 41 In determining what constitutes knowledge
of unrecorded instruments, New Mexico applies the rule of constructive
notice by possession.3 42 An exception to the rule of constructive notice
by possession has been recognized where a purchaser made diligent inquiry
but was unable to obtain knowledge of the unrecorded instrument or
the rights of the parties claiming under the unrecorded instrument.3 43 The
rule of constructive notice by possession had previously been applied in
New Mexico only to purchasers. 3" In Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Hodges,3 45
the court of appeals, for the first time in New Mexico, applied the rule
of constructive notice by possession to a judgment lien creditor.
In 1979 Rutledge executed a mortgage in favor of Mutual Savings of
El Paso and recorded the mortgage in the county clerk's office. 46 Later
that year, Rutledge sold the property to the Hodges. 47 Rutledge and
Hodges executed a written sales contract but did not record it. 348 In the
contract, the Hodges agreed to assume Rutledge's mortgage in favor of
Mutual Savings and to pay Rutledge a specified sum over a period of
five years. 349 The warranty deed conveying the property to the Hodges
was in escrow and also not recorded. 3 0 The Hodges continuously occupied
the property as their 35residence and made improvements to the property
in excess of $25,000. 1
In 1983 Citizens Bank obtained a judgment against Rutledge and
recorded a transcript of judgment against the property in the county

339. Id.
340. Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Hodges, 107 N.M. 329, 757 P.2d 799 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
107 N.M. 74, 752 P.2d 789 (1988). See infra notes 345-71 and accompanying text.
341. The Recording Act provides: "No deed, mortgage or other instrument in writing, not recorded
in accordance with Section 14-9-1 NMSA 1978, shall affect the title or rights to, in any real estate,
of any purchaser, mortgagee in good faith or judgment lien creditor, without knowledge of the
existence of such unrecorded instruments." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-9-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
342. See Nelms v. Miller, 56 N.M. 132, 241 P.2d 333 (1952). Stated generally, "[O]pen, notorious
and exclusive possession of real estate under claim of ownership is constructive notice to the world
of whatever claim the possessor asserts, whether such claim is legal or equitable in its nature." Id.
at 156, 241 P.2d at 349.
343. McBee v. O'Connell, 19 N.M. 565, 145 P. 123 (1914).
344. Nelms, 56 N.M. at 157, 241 P.2d at 349. "A purchaser who negligently or intentionally
fails to inquire as to the fact of possession, or as to the title or interests of the person in possession,
is affected with notice of such title or interest as the possessor actually has." Id
345. 107 N.M. 329, 757 P.2d 799 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 74, 752 P.2d 789 (1988).
346. Id. at 330, 757 P.2d at 800.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 330-31, 757 P.2d at 800-01.
351. Id.
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clerk's office.31 2 The records still showed Rutledge as the owner of the
property since the warranty deed to the Hodges was in escrow.353 In
February 1985, at the time of escrow closing, the Hodges took out a
mortgage with Western Bank.3 54 The warranty deed and the Western Bank
mortgage were then recorded.3 1 In April 1985, Hodges informed Citizens
356
Bank that the bank's lien interfered with a pending sale of the property.
Citizens Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Rutledge, Hodges,
and Western Bank.3 17 Hodges and Western Bank counterclaimed for
cancellation of the transcript of judgment.5 The trial court granted
Citizens Bank's motion for summary judgment, foreclosing the judgment
lien and ordering the sale of the property. 5 9 Hodges and Western Bank
appealed, 360 claiming that the Hodges' actual possession of the property
was sufficient to put Citizens Bank on notice of their legal interest, thus
disallowing attachment of the judgment lien against Rutledge. 361 Citizens
Bank argued that the rule of constructive notice by possession was an
anachronism
and should not be applied to the bank as judgment lien
3 62
creditor.
The court rejected Citizens Bank's argument and applied the rule 3of63
constructive notice by possession to the bank as judgment lien creditor.
The court found no reason why the rule should not apply equally to
purchasers, mortgagees, and judgment lien creditors.3 " The New Mexico
constructive notice statute 365 treats them equally, and the court found
that the specific language of the statute must control.3 6 The court reasoned
that to find that the rule of constructive notice by possession did not
apply to judgment lien creditors would not only treat judgment lien
creditors differently than purchasers and mortgagees but would also
require innocent third parties to pay the debts of someone else.3 67 The
court also found that Citizens Bank was not entitled to the exception
to the rule of constructive notice by possession because the bank failed
to make diligent inquiry into possession.3 6 The court noted that Citizens
Bank knew Rutledge was in California and should have inquired about
the status of the property and possession of the property prior to filing

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 331, 757 P.2d at 801.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 330, 757 P.2d at 800.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 332, 757 P.2d at 802.
Id.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-9-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
Citizens Bank, 107 N.M. at 332, 757 P.2d at 802.
Id. at 332-33, 757 P.2d at 802-03.
Id. at 333, 757 P.2d at 803.
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the judgment. 69 Citizens Bank, the court concluded, should bear
the
3 70
burden of its failure to inquire into possession of the property.
The decision in Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Hodges expanded the rule
of constructive notice by possession to include judgment lien creditors
in addition to purchasers and mortgagees. Unfortunately, House Bill 231,
passed by the 39th New Mexico Legislature in its second session of 1990
and approved by the governor on March 2, 1990, overrides Citizens
Bank.37
VII.

REAL ESTATE BROKERS OR SALESPERSONS

Under the Real Estate Recovery Fund Act,37 2 the New Mexico Real
Estate Commission administers a fund for the benefit of persons who
are unable to satisfy judgments obtained against a real estate broker or
salesperson. 73 Claims may be made against the fund only when acts of
wrongdoing occur based upon transactions for which a real estate broker's
or salesperson's license is required. 374 In Garcia v. New Mexico Real
Estate Commission,3s 1 the court of appeals held that there could be no
recovery under the Real Estate Recovery Fund Act for the sale of a real
estate contract because a real estate contract, as an item of personal
property, is not included in the definition of real estate under the Act.
Garcia and Lopez transferred money to Aqui, a licensed real estate
broker, for investment in real estate contracts.3 76 Garcia and Lopez both
obtained judgments against Aqui for damages resulting from the trans3 77
actions but were unable to satisfy the judgments out of Aqui's property.
Both filed suit to recover under the Real Estate Recovery Fund Act.3 7 s
In Garcia's case, the trial court denied recovery on the ground that a
real estate license was not required for the transactions. 79 In Lopez's
case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lopez on
the ground that a real estate license was required for the underlying
transactions.380 Garcia appealed the decision reached in his case; the Real

369.
370.
371.
to the

Id.
Id.
House Bill 231 amends N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-9-3 (1978) by adding the following language
statute:
Possession alone based on an unrecorded executory real estate contract shall not
be construed against any subsequent purchaser, mortgagee in good faith or judgment
lien creditor either to impute knowledge of or to impose the duty to inquire about
the possession or the provisions of the instruments.
For a detailed discussion of House Bill 231 and its effect on New Mexico law, see Flickinger,
Scheible & Fritz, Legislature Tampers with Recording Act, 20 N.M.L. REv. 235 (1990) (this issue).
372. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-29-20 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
373. Id.
374. Id.

375. 108 N.M. 591, 775 P.2d 1308 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 624, 776 P.2d 846 (1989)
(consolidated with Lopez v. New Mexico Real Estate Comm'n).
376. Id. at 593, 775 P.2d at 1310.
377. Id. at 592, 775 P.2d at 1309.

378. Id.
379. Id. at 593, 775 P.2d at 1310.
380. Id.
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Estate Commission appealed the Lopez decision."a ' Because of the dis8 2
parate decisions, the court of appeals consolidated the cases for review.1
On appeal, Garcia and Lopez contended that real estate contracts were
intended to be included in the definition of real estate in the Real Estate
Brokers and Salesmen Act," 3 even though the contracts are personal
property.3 4 They reasoned that personal property is included in the Act
because leaseholds, as personal property, are included in the definition
of real estate." 5 The court of appeals rejected this argument, finding
that the legislature clearly did not intend to include all personal property
in the definition of real estate, but only those personal property interests,
such as leaseholds, which involve a right to use the property.38 6 The court
affirmed the judgment against Garcia and reversed the summary judgment
in favor of Lopez. 8 7
After the decision in Garcia v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission,
persons investing in real estate contracts through real estate brokers will
be unable to recover from the Real Estate Recovery Fund.
VIII.

WATER RIGHTS

Two New Mexico cases during the survey period discussed water rights.
One case, In re Sleeper,"8 held that water rights do not include a right
to receive a traditional amount of silt. Another case, Sun Vineyards,
Inc. v. Luna County Wine Development Corp.,389 determined at what
point water rights are severed from one location after an application to
spread water rights to another location is filed.
In In re Sleeper, Tierra Grande, Inc. and Penasco Ski Corporation
began a recreational development and subdivision in Ensenada and dug
a gravel pit to supply gravel for construction of roads in the subdivision.3 90
Tierra Grande decided to create a lake over the gravel pit for recreational
and aesthetic purposes. 39' Tierra Grande contracted with the Sleepers to
purchase lands and appurtenant water rights to construct the lake.3 92
Tierra Grande conditioned its purchase of the Sleepers' land upon the
State Engineer's approval of an Application for Change of Purpose and
Place of Use and Point of Diversion of the Sleepers' water rights. 9 The
application sought to change the point of diversion from the Sleepers'
farms off the Ensenada Ditch to the proposed lake site on the Nutritas

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
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Id. at 592, 775 P.2d at 1309.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-29-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
Garcia, 108 N.M. at 595, 775 P.2d at 1312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 597, 775 P.2d at 1314.
107 N.M. 494, 760 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1988).
107 N.M. 524, 760 P.2d 1290 (1988).
Sleeper, 107 N.M. at 496, 760 P.2d at 789.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Spring 1990]

PROPERTY

Creek and to change the purpose of use from irrigation to construction
and maintenance of a lake. 39
The Ensenada, Porvenir, and Park View Ditches divert from the Rio
Brazos. 39 The Nutritas Creek is a tributary of the Rio Brazos and empties
into the Ensenada and Park View Ditches after they divert from the Rio
3 97
Brazos. 31 The Nutritas is fed by spring snow melt and summer rain.
The Nutritas begins to run in March and is usually dry by May or early
June.3 9 The water from the Nutritas, when flowing, is used by members
of the Ensenada and Park View Ditches to water stock in the spring,
to fill irrigation reservoirs in the summer, and to fertilize or enrich the
soil with the Nutritas' historically high silt content. 39
The State Engineer issued an order granting the Sleepers' application.4
Ensenada Land and Water Association appealed to the district court of
Rio Arriba County.4°0 After trial de novo, the district court reversed the
State Engineer's decision and denied the application on the grounds that
the requested transfer would impair existing water rights on the Rio
Brazos stream system and would be contrary to the public interest.4
The Sleepers and the State Engineer appealed. 403 The court of appeals
reversed the district court.404
On appeal, Ensenada argued that construction of the lake would reduce
the silt content of the Nutritas water and that a reduction in silt content
was a reduction in the quality of water and thus not permissible under
New Mexico law. 405 Ensenada urged the court to treat a reduction in silt
content in the same way as the court treats an increase in salt content,
citing prior New Mexico cases which held that increased salt content in
water diminished the quality of the water.40 The court rejected Ensenada's
argument and held that water rights do not include a right to receive a
traditional or historic amount of silt.40 The court distinguished the salt
cases by noting that salt becomes chemically associated with water in a
solution while silt is physically associated with water in suspension. 401
The court of appeals followed a Colorado case directly on point which
held that the definition of water under the Colorado Constitution does
not include silt.40 The court of appeals noted that the definition of

394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 495, 760 P.2d at 788.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 499, 760 P.2d at 792.
406. Id. (citing Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962) and Stokes v. Morgan,
101 N.M. 195, 680 P.2d 335 (1984)).
407. 107 N.M. at 499, 760 P.2d at 792.
408. Id.
409. A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 196 Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57 (1978).
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water under the New Mexico Constitution 410 is virtually identical to the
Colorado definition of water, 41' and the New Mexico definition also

does not include

silt.412

The court reasoned that to hold that water

rights included a right to receive a traditional amount of silt would
restrain all upstream users from using their lands in a manner which
might reduce silt downstream. 413 The court of appeals in Sleeper refused
to expand water rights in New Mexico to include a right to receive a
traditional or historic amount of silt carried in the water.
In Sun Vineyards, Inc. v. Luna County Wine Development Corp. 414
the supreme court discussed at what point severance of water rights
appurtenant to one location occurs under an application to spread those
water rights to another location. In general, once an application is filed
and approved, the water rights are severed from the old location and
become appurtenant to the new location. 4 5 The State Engineer, however,
has authority to approve the application subject to conditions precedent,
and the transfer may not vest until the applicant meets those conditions. 4 6 The court held that the transfer of water rights under an
application to spread water rights does not vest until the water has
been put to beneficial use and proof of beneficial use is filed with the
State Engineer's Office.
Luna County Wine Development, by early 1983, had acquired approximately 720 acres of land in Luna County which included 467.1
acres with block or flood irrigation rights of three acre-feet per acre
per year from the Mimbres Underground Water Basin. 41 7 In January
1984, Wine Development filed with the State Engineer's Office an
Application for Permit to Change Place or Purpose of Use of Underground Waters and Combine Wells. 418 The State Engineer approved the
application, thus permitting the spreading of the water rights from the
467.1 acres over the entire 720-acre tract. 419 The approval resulted in
a duty of water less than three acre-feet per acre per year to the extent
more than 467.1 acres were put to beneficial use.4 20 In August 1984,
Wine Development conveyed by warranty deed to Pascal Moulin, Sun
Vineyards' predecessor-in-interest and president, 84.48 acres "with water
rights." ' 42 ' Of the 84.48 acres, 76.61 were irrigated vineyard and thus
part of the 467.1 acre parcel
of land which was the subject of Wine
422
Development's application.
410. N.M.

CONST.

art. XVI, § 2.

411. CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.

412. 107 N.M. at 499, 760 P.2d at 792.
413. Id.
414. 107 N.M. 524, 760 P.2d 1290 (1988).
415. Id. at 526-27, 760 P.2d at 1292-93 (citing City of Roswell v. Berry, 80 N.M. 110, 452 P.2d
179 (1969)).
416. City of Roswell, 80 N.M. at 114, 452 P.2d at 183.
417. Sun Vineyards, 107 N.M. at 525, 760 P.2d at 1291.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
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In 1986 a dispute arose between Sun Vineyards and Wine Development
regarding the water rights to which Sun Vineyards was entitled under
its contract of purchase. 423 Sun Vineyards contended the deed "with
water rights" entitled it to water rights with an overall farm duty of
three acre-feet per acre per year for the irrigated lands. 424 Wine Development contended that the only water rights appurtenant to the land
at the time of execution of the contract consisted of an overall farm
of the spreading
duty of 1.636 acre-feet per acre per year as a 4 result
25
allowed under Wine Development's application.

4 26
Sun Vineyards sued Wine Development, alleging breach of contract.
The district court ruled in favor of Sun Vineyards, ordered the transfer
of water rights of three acre-feet per acre per year to cover the acreage
in irrigation on the 84.48 acre tract sold to Sun Vineyards, and awarded
$30,000 in damages for Wine Development's breach of contract.4 27 Wine
Development appealed .428
On appeal, Wine Development contended that once an application is
filed and approved, the water rights are severed from the old location
and become appurtenant to the new location. 429 Once its application to
spread water rights was approved, Wine Development argued, the transfer vested, and the only water rights appurtenant to the tract sold to
Sun Vineyards were the 1.636 acre-feet per acre per year resulting from
the spreading of water rights over the 720-acre tract.4 30 The supreme
court disagreed, finding that the transfer did not vest until (1) the water
had been put to beneficial use, and (2) final proofs and surveys dem431
onstrating beneficial use were filed with the State Engineer's Office.
Wine Development failed to file final proofs and surveys demonstrating
beneficial use, and thus the transfer and spreading of water rights did
not vest. 43 2 The supreme court also found that where a portion of the
land subject to the application was sold without reservation of the right
to continue the procedure necessary to spread that land's water rights
over the larger area, the procedure to accomplish spreading of the water
was interrupted by the sale, and the transfer of water rights from the

433
conveyed land did not vest.

In light of the Sun Vineyards decision, a parcel of land which is the
subject of an application to spread water rights appurtenant to that
parcel should not be sold or conveyed until the transfer of water rights
from that parcel is complete and has vested, unless the conveyance
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at 526, 760 P.2d at 1292.
at 525, 760 P.2d at 1291.
at 526, 760 P.2d at 1292.

at 527, 760 P.2d at 1293.
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states that the right to continue the procedure permitting spreading is
reserved.
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